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Abstract: Recently, Wang et al. presented an efficient logistic map based block encryption 
system.  The  encryption  system  employs  feedback  ciphertext  to  achieve  plaintext 
dependence  of  sub-keys.  Unfortunately,  we  discovered  that  their  scheme  is  unable  to 
withstand key stream attack. To improve its security, this paper proposes a novel chaotic 
map based block cryptosystem. At the same time, a secure architecture for camera sensor 
network is constructed. The network comprises a set of inexpensive camera sensors to 
capture  the  images,  a  sink  node  equipped  with  sufficient  computation  and  storage 
capabilities and a data processing server. The transmission security between the sink node 
and the server is gained by utilizing the improved cipher. Both theoretical analysis and 
simulation  results  indicate  that  the  improved  algorithm  can  overcome  the  flaws  and 
maintain all the merits of the original cryptosystem. In addition, computational costs and 
efficiency of the proposed scheme are encouraging for the practical implementation in the 
real environment as well as camera sensor network. 
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1. Introduction 
Camera Sensor Networks (CSNs) are usually built with a large number of inexpensive, small and 
battery-powered devices. They have been used for a wide variety of applications such as environment 
monitoring, health monitoring, military sensing and tracking, etc. [1]. As CSNs are widely deployed in 
remote and hostile environments to transmit sensitive information by broadcast, sensor nodes are prone 
to node compromise attacks and security issues such as data confidentiality and integrity are extremely 
important. Hence, security becomes a very serious concern in wireless CSN protocols. Unfortunately, 
the sensors have limited power, computation, storage and communication capabilities, they impose 
several constraints on the algorithms and protocols that can be effectively deployed for such systems. 
In this scenario, most of the traditional security mechanisms are useless. Thus, the research of new 
efficient security techniques such as block and stream cipher [2,3] is needed. 
As  a  very  complicated  phenomenon  of  nonlinear  system,  chaos  has  inherent  analogous 
cryptographic properties such as sensitive to parameter and initial state, which inspires people to apply 
it into cryptography  [4,5] are representative works. Since Baptista proposed a novel cryptosystem 
based on the property of ergodicity of chaotic systems [5], a number of new algorithms based on 
variations of Baptista’s one have been published [6,7]. However, most of those modified methods can’t 
possess  both  fast  encryption  speed  and  flat  ciphertext  distribution.  To  solve  these  problems,  
Xiang et al. [8] proposed a novel chaotic block cryptosystem based on [5,9,10]. Unfortunately, the 
sub-keys of this scheme are independent of the plaintext and are determined only by the secret key, 
which  will  cause  chosen  plaintext  attack  and  differential  known-plaintext  attack  [11,12].  
Wang et al. [11] put forward an improved version by utilizing ciphertext feedback. 
This  paper  studies  the  security  of  Wang  et  al.  scheme  and  reports  the  following  findings:  (1) 
Without the secret key, any ciphertext can be decrypted by using only two identical length of chosen 
ciphertext sequences; (2) It is vulnerable to key stream attack (KSA), i.e., the underlying chaotic key 
stream sequence of any key   can be deduced from some chosen plaintext and ciphertext pairs. 
By utilizing the calculated chaotic key stream sequence, any ciphertext encrypted by key  can be 
decrypted efficiently. To provide an efficient cryptographic primitive and eliminate the weaknesses of 
Wang et al. scheme, this paper presents a modified chaotic block cryptographic algorithm on CSN. 
Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme is more secure than the original one. In addition, the 
high computational efficiency promotes its application in CSN.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the Wang et al. scheme. 
Section 3 elaborates the chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) and the key stream attack (KSA). A secure 
chaotic block cipher in camera sensor network and its performance analysis are given in Section 4 and 5. 
Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
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2. Review of Wang et al. Cryptosystem 
In this cryptosystem, the secret key is , where  and   is the initial condition and control 
parameter of the following chaotic logistic map, respectively: 
,    (1)  
Writing the value of x in a binary representation: 
  (2)  
A binary sequence , where n is the length of the sequence and   is the nth 
iteration of the logistic map, can be obtained by iterating the logistic map. The whole procedure of this 
scheme can be described in the following steps and an illustration is given in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Block diagram of Wang et al. scheme. 
 
 
Step 1. Get the start point   which denotes the real value of x from the last   transient iterations, 
i.e.,  . Note that we set in all the following simulations. 
Step 2. Divide the plaintext P into subsequences   of length l bytes (here l = 8): 
   (3)  
Step 3. Set  ; 
Step 4. Based on the method to generate binary sequences by iterating the logistic map, obtain a  
64-bit binary sequence   and a 6-bit binary sequence   formed by all 
the third bits, i.e., i = 3 in Equation (2), through 70 iterations of the logistic map.   is the decimal 
value of . 
Step 5. Compute the jth ciphertext block: 
  (4)  
where and  denote the left cyclic shift and XOR operation, respectively. 
Step 6. Dividing the ciphertext block   into 8-bit partitions and obtain the ciphertext . 
Step  7.  If  all  the  plaintexts  have  already  been  encrypted,  the  encryption  process  is  finished. 
Otherwise, calculate: 
) , ( 0 x   0 x
) 1 ( ) ( x x x    ] 1 , 0 [  x
}. 1 , 0 { ) ( ], 1 , 0 [ , ) ( ) ( ) ( . 0 2 1    x b x x b x b x b x i i  

  0 ))} ( ( { n
n
i
n
i x b B  ) (x
n 
 0 N
) ( 0
0 x
N    100 0  N
j P
  j P P P P 2 1 
1  j
64 2 1
i i i j B B B A  
70 66 65
i i i j B B B A   
j D
j A
j j j j A D P C    ) (
 
j C
8 2 1 , , , j j j c c c 
Logistic map ( , ) 
Iterate 70 times 
Sequence Aj(64bits) 
Key-dependent permutation 
Plaintext block Pj(64bits) 
Permuted block  j P(64bits) 
Encrypted block Cj 
Dj 
Compute f(Cj) 
Iterate Dj + f(Cj) times Sensors 2011, 11                                       
 
 
1610 
  (5)  
 
(6)  
  (7)  
 
(8)  
and go to Step 4. 
The decryption process is almost the same as the encryption one. Just need to replace Equation (4) 
with: 
  (9)  
where denote the right cyclic shift operation. 
3. Cryptanalysis of Wang et al. Cryptosystem 
According to Kerchoff ’s principle [13], the cryptanalyst knows exactly the design and working of 
the cryptosystem under study except the secret key. The general types of cryptanalytic attacks [14] are 
enumerated  as  follows,  ordered  from  the  hardest  type  of  attack  to  easiest:  ciphertext  only  attack, 
known plaintext attack, chosen plaintext attack and chosen ciphertext attack. In each of these four 
attacks, the objective is to determine the key that was used. It suffices that one of the attacks is feasible 
to consider an algorithm insecure.  
In the following subsections, we will perform a chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) and a key stream 
attack  (KSA)  on  Wang  et  al.  scheme.  For  convenient  illustration,  suppose  and
are the plaintext and ciphertext pairs,  and  denote 
the corresponding secret key and key stream, respectively.  
3.1. Chosen Ciphertext Attack  
A chosen-ciphertext attack [15] operates under the following model: an adversary is allowed access 
to plaintext-ciphertext pairs for some number of ciphertexts of his choice, and thereafter attempts to 
use this information to recover the key (or plaintext corresponding to some new ciphertext). 
In the Wang et al. scheme, Equations (5–7) indicate that the space of the feedback message is only 
64, i.e., once the secret key   is determined, the key stream Dj+1 and Aj+1 are determined only by 
the former ciphertext . To illustration this security loophole, we set the secret keys ,
 and  decrypt  two  different  ciphertext  sequences.  They  are  C1=“EAFA4D22D3 
26D40C2960D4C5E76…” and C2=“F11ED8CA5F72155E8A99683495F…” in hexadecimal format. 
Each block of ,  ,  and  are filled  into Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  
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Table 1. Decryption of C1 using , . 
j  Cj  f(Cj) mod 64  Dj  Aj 
1  EAFA4D22D326D40C  35  10  5E0AEF19A566A729 
2  2960D4C5E768138D  36  03  D6E5053AF966B07E 
3  C716165410ACD847  12  1D  EF5FCAE1DB5FA883 
4  3C991CA5F1E8FCC6  20  2E  4246A2AAADA975E2 
Table 2. Decryption of C2 using , . 
j  Cj  f(Cj) mod 64  Dj  Aj 
1  F11ED8CA5F72155E  35  10  5E0AEF19A566A729 
2  8A99683495FDBAAB  36  03  D6E5053AF966B07E 
3  CC1E07D524E0E7A1  12  1D  EF5FCAE1DB5FA883 
4  D9D58D603B600C1E  20  2E  4246A2AAADA975E2 
 
The  simulation  results  indicate  that  once ,  and  all  the  former  ciphertext  blocks  have 
equal             , any ciphertext has identical sub-key      and     . This loophole is vulnerable to 
CCA, one of CCA illustration can be played as follows: (they cannot be showed completely). 
(1) Let  denotes the 6-bit length of              in binary representation. For   select 
two cipher blocks: 
 
(10)  
 
(11)  
From Equation (5), it is not difficult to see that: 
         (12)  
To demonstrate this procedure, we fill the chosen corresponding   and  of a random selected 
ciphertext C = 218A916626 E5DA55… (in hexadecimal format) into Table 3. 
Table 3. The chosen C
1 and C
2 of C. 
j  Cj  f(Cj) mod 64  Chosen    Chosen   
1  218A916626E5DA55  28  00000000000000DC  0000000000001C00 
2  BA53340E52524733  45  00000000000000ED  0000000000002D00 
3  2C2CE7EEB40BA7EC  63  00000000000000FF  0000000000003F00 
4  B19F2A8A8BBAB8BD  62  00000000000000FE  0000000000003E00 
 
(2)  Decrypt   and  using  the  same  key   of
,  then  we  can  get  the  corresponding  plaintext  and
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. From Equations (6) and (12) we can deduce that  ,  and  have the identical 
corresponding sub-keys   and . 
(3) Calculate   
From Equations (10) and (11), we can obtain that: 
  
(13)  
Therefore, we can determine the value of  by searching the position of   in . 
(4)  Using  Equation  (4)  and  the  conquered ,  we  can  calculate .  To 
demonstrate  these  procedures,  the  chosen   and of  Table  3  are  decrypted  using , 
. The corresponding plaintext blocks and sub-keys are filled into Table 4. 
Table 4. Decrypt the chosen C
1 and C
2 of Table 3 using , . 
j        Dj  Aj 
1  A7F55E0AEF19A566  BB295E0AEF19A566  1CDC000000000000  16  5E0AEF19A566A729 
2  ABA16BD9AC1F83AC  ABB79D59AC1F83AC  0016F68000000000  25  B3583F075957423A 
3  2B876D414E8FBD7F  2B8762BE8E8FBD7F  00000FFFC0000000  34  3A3EF5FCAE1DB5FA 
4  6A2A9568E24C2424  6A252AE8E24C2424  000FBF8000000000  26  A389309091A8AAAB 
 
(5) By utilizing  and , it is easy to figure out the plaintext 
  (14)  
Some simulations are utilized to prove the validity of CCA. Figure 2(a-c) are the original image, the 
encrypted image with Wang et al’s scheme and the analyzed image of a 128 ×  128 bitmap image file 
named Boat, where the secret key  ,   and N0 = 100. 
Figure 2. (a) Plaintext. (b) The ciphertext. (c) The result of attack. 
 
3.2. Key Stream Attack 
In  the  Wang  et  al.  scheme  [11],  although  a  ciphertext  feedback  model  is  employed  to  ensure  
sub-keys depend on both secret key and plaintext, a fundamental flaw is unaware, i.e., the first sub-key 
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and  are  independent  of  the  plaintext  and  are  determined  only  by  the  secret  key .  An 
adversary can reconstruct the key stream sequence as an equivalent key   as follows: 
(1). Choose two pair of special messages and , where   is composed of 64-bit zeros, 
 is  011…11  in  binary  representation,   and  are  the  corresponding  ciphertext  of and , 
respectively. 
(2). Set   as the first plaintext block, then can get . 
(3).  Similarly,  when  set   as  the  first  plaintext  block, ,  i.e., 
. Thus the position of zero in   counting from rightmost bit is equal to . 
(4). Set , and define a plaintext sequence , where   is a null string. 
(5).  . By utilizing , choose  to make sure 
  (15)  
From  Equation  (7),  it  can  be  seen  that  the  sub-keys  of , , 
and  are continuous state bit of logistic map. 
(6). Decrypt  with  and : 
  (16)  
(7). Set , i.e., add   as the last 64 bits of . 
(8).  Encrypt  the  64(k  +  1)-bit  length  plaintext  sequence ,  and  then  obtain  the 
corresponding ciphertext: 
 
(17)  
Obviously,  is equal to  when , and . Therefore, it 
can be calculated that . 
(9).  Encrypt  another  64(k  +  1)-bit  length  plaintext  sequence ,  and  then  obtain  the 
corresponding ciphertext: 
  (18)  
Similarly,  is  equal  to when ,  and ,  i.e., 
.  Utilizing the computed , the adversary can obtain  by counting the 
position of zero in   from rightmost bit.  
(10) Go to (5) if the length of the key stream sequence is not enough; otherwise, finish the attack. 
For , translate decimal value  to the corresponding 6-bit length binary sequence , 
and  then  the  adversary  can  acquire  a  70j-bit  length  binary  key  stream  sequence
of secret key . We denote . 
The key stream  can be utilized to decrypt any ciphertext encrypted by . To demonstrate 
this circumstance, ciphertext is decrypted as follows: 
(1). Define . Set the start point of kth sub-key in  as . 
(2). Obviously, the kth sub-key of  is , i.e.,  ,   is the decimal 
value of  . And then we can obtain the kth plaintext block: 
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  (19)  
(3). If , continue; otherwise, finish the decryption process. 
(4). By utilizing the known ,   and Equations (5) and (6), it is easy to obtain the value of  . 
Thus, we can utilize Equation (7) to calculate the start point of (k+1)th sub-key in : 
   (20)  
(5). Compute  and go to (2). 
As a result,    is decrypted effectively with key stream sequence . 
4. Proposed Secure Block Cipher for Camera Sensor Networks 
4.1. Secure Block Cipher Algorithm 
The Wang et al. cryptosystem is cryptographically weak because information about the feedback 
value  leaks into the ciphertext and the first sub-key is independent of plaintext. Except these flaws, 
it has some excellent benefits, such as flat ciphertext, fast encryption speed and prominent diffusion 
and confusion. Therefore it is valuable to propose an improved version to get rid of above flaws. As 
for the first flaw, it can be remedied via hiding  from ciphertext, and the latter can be conquered by 
pretreating of the first plaintext block. Detail of the improvement is described as follows: 
Steps 1-4. They are the same as Wang et al. scheme described in Section 2.  
Step 5. Compute: 
,   (21)  
. 
(22)  
Step 6. Obtain the jth ciphertext block ( ): 
  (23)  
 
(24)  
 
(25)  
Obviously, after the modified process, the feedback value  is hidden from ciphertext. Encrypt 
and  , then one can obtain: 
  (26)  
 
(27)  
Equations (26) and (27) leak noting about the key stream  and , so the security is enhanced in 
the improvement. Though it involves some computations, they are not time consuming operations. 
Therefore, the improved scheme does not lose the original efficiency advantage. 
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4.2. Architecture of Wireless Camera Sensor Networks 
In  this  section,  we  introduce  the  developed  architecture  of  the  secure  wireless  camera  sensor 
networks by utilizing the proposed chaotic block cipher. Each camera sensor node in the networks is 
battery-powered and has limited computation and wireless communication capabilities. The sink is a 
data collection center equipped with sufficient computation and storage capabilities. Camera sensor 
nodes  periodically  send  the captured  images  to  the sink  node.  Then the  sink  nodes  transport  this 
information secretly with the data process server via carrier networks. The proposed block cipher is 
mounting at the carrier network. Figure 3 shows the system architecture of the camera sensor network. 
Figure 3. System architecture of the camera sensor network. 
 
5. Performance Analysis 
5.1. Information Entropy Analysis 
It is known that the entropy H(m) of a message source m can be calculated by Equation (28) [8]: 
   (28)  
where   represents the probability of symbol  . The entropy is expressed in bits. For a purely 
random source emitting 2N symbols, the entropy is H(m) = N. For encrypted messages, the entropy 
should ideally be H(m) = N . 
When  a  cipher  emits  symbols  with  entropy  less  than  N,  there  exists  a  certain  degree  of 
predictability, which threatens its security. Let us consider the ciphertext of  a random text file,  a 
Lena’s image of size 256 ×  256 and a random video file encrypted using the proposed scheme. The 
number of occurrence of each ciphertext pixel   is recorded and the probability of occurrence is 
computed for the  three  files.  The corresponding entropies are filled into Table  5.  The test  values 
obtained are very close to the theoretical value N = 8 for the three kinds of files. This means that 
information leakage in the encryption process is negligible and the encryption system is secure against 
the entropy attack.   

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Table 5. Entropy test result. 
Test file  Lena  Text file  Video file  
Ciphertext entropy  7.9923  7.9981  7.9919 
5.2. Correlation of Adjacent Pixels in Encrypted Image 
In order to resist statistical attacks, the ciphertext should possess certain random properties. A detail 
study has been explored and the results are summarized. The results of the Lena.bmp are used for 
illustration. For an ordinary image, each pixel is usually highly correlated with its adjacent pixels 
either in horizontal, vertical or diagonal directions. These high-correlation properties can be quantified 
as their correlation coefficients for comparison. To calculate the correlation coefficients, the following 
formulas are used: 
  (29)  
  (30)  
  (31)  
 
(32)  
where x and y are the grey-scale value of two adjacent pixels in the image and N is the total number of 
pixels selected from the image for the calculation. In Table 6 and Figure 4, the correlation coefficients of 
Lena image and those of its encrypted image with the secret key (μ = 3.998, x0 = 0.21745) are given.  
Table 6. The correlation coefficients of the adjacent pixels. 
Positions  Plaintext image  Ciphertext image 
Horizontal  0.98448  0.0031261 
Vertical  0.94878  0.0057563 
Diagonal  0.96787  0.0130690 
 
It is clear that there is negligible correlation between these two  adjacent pixels in the encrypted 
image. However, the two adjacent  pixels in the original image are highly correlated.   The results 
indicate that the proposed algorithm has successfully removed the correlation of adjacent pixels in the 
plain-image so that neighbor pixels in the cipher-image virtually have no correlation. That is to say, the 
new scheme possesses prominent diffusion property. 
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Figure 4. Correlation of the adjacent pixels (1–3)are plaintext and (4–6) are ciphertext. 
 
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
From the cryptographical point of view, given two distinct keys, even if their difference is the 
minimal  value  under  the  current  finite  precision,  the  encryption  and  decryption  results  of  a  good 
cryptosystem should still be completely different. In other words, this cryptosystem should have a very 
high sensitivity to the secret key [14]. For testing the key sensitivity of the proposed block encryption 
procedure, we use the grayscale image Lena.bmp of size 256 ×  256 as the test image to illustrate the 
result and perform the following steps: 
(1). Lena.bmp is encrypted by using the secret key (μ = 3.998, x0 = 0.21745) and the resultant image 
is referred as Ciphertext A;  
(2).  The  same  image  is  encrypted  by  making  the  slight  modification  in  the  secret  key  i.e.,  
(μ = 3.998 + 10
−15, x0 = 0.21745) and the resultant image is referred as Ciphertext B; 
(3). Again, the same original image is encrypted by making the slight modification in the secret key 
i.e., (μ = 3.998, x0 = 0.21745 + 10
−15) and the resultant image is referred as Ciphertext C; 
(4). The same original image is encrypted by making the slight modification in the secret key i.e.,  
(μ = 3.998, x0 = 0.21745 − 10
−15) and the resultant image is referred as Ciphertext D.  
(5). Finally, the correlation coefficients between the corresponding pixels of the four ciphertexts A, 
B, C and D are computed and filled into Table 7. 
It is clear from the Table 7 that no correlation exists among four encrypted images even though 
these have been produced by using slightly different secret keys. These results sufficiently demonstrate 
the proposed cryptosystem is highly key sensitive. 
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Table 7. The correlation coefficients of the ciphertexts. 
Ciphertext 1  Ciphertext 2  Correlation Coefficient 
Ciphertext A  Ciphertext B  0.00296 
Ciphertext A  Ciphertext C  0.00137 
Ciphertext A  Ciphertext D  0.00429 
Ciphertext B  Ciphertext C  0.00153 
Ciphertext B  Ciphertext D  0.00194 
Ciphertext C  Ciphertext D  0.00296 
 
Another cryptographical property required by a good cryptosystem is that the encryption should be 
very sensitive to plaintext, i.e., the ciphertexts of two plaintexts with a slight difference should be very 
different [14]. Figure 5 is the bit-wise XOR of two ciphertexts when encrypting two image plaintexts 
with only the first bit different based on the proposed cryptosystem. The result of Figure 5 showing 
that the proposed encryption scheme is very sensitive with respect to small changes in the plaintext. 
Figure 5. Bit-wise XOR of two ciphertexts. 
 
 
From the above investigation and study, we can conclude that the lack of security will discourage 
the use of these algorithms for secure applications. It is advisable that new chaotic cryptosystems take 
into account some important things: (1) the distribution of the ciphertext should be sufficiently flat in 
order to resist the statistics attack [8]; (2) the sub keys should depend on not only the secret key but 
also the plaintext to avoid key stream attack [11]; (3) the first block or sub key should be pretreated to 
resist some existing attacks; (4) the ciphertext should not leak out any information of the sub keys to 
eliminate corresponding utilizing ciphertext attacks. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the security of a block cipher based on logistic map proposed in [11]. It 
demonstrated that [11] is vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attack and key stream attack. Then it gave an 
enhancement version on wireless camera sensor network. Performance analysis demonstrates that the 
proposed  scheme  possesses  the  original  benefits  as  well  as  enhancing  its  security.  The  sample 
procedure  and  efficiency  of  the  new  scheme  are  encouraging  for  the  practical  implementation  in 
wireless camera sensor network. 
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